7-FOLLESDAL INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

6/13/2016 3:14 PM

SUBSIDIARITY AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN-RIGHTS COURTS: RESPECTING
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS—OR NEITHER?
ANDREAS FØLLESDAL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Several regional and international courts (ICs) and treaty bodies are
empowered to review whether a state’s legislation and policies are consistent
with the human-rights conventions it has signed. Such human-rights review
presents both theoretical and practical puzzles concerning the tensions between
protecting human rights and respecting democratic sovereignty. These
dilemmas are central to discussions about how both the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) interpret and apply their respective conventions: the European and
1
the American Conventions on Human Rights (ECHR and ACHR). Academics
and politicians have criticized both ICs for their alleged illegitimate
intervention into well-functioning democracies, most famously by the United
Kingdom in its 2012 proposal that states in the Council of Europe should
2
severely prune the authority of the ECtHR.
Scholars, politicians, and judges often use conceptions of subsidiarity as a
normative framework for assessing how to allocate and exercise authority
within a multilevel political and legal order. Principles of subsidiarity
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1. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14)
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
2. Council of Europe, High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights⎯Draft Brighton Declaration, ¶ 23(c)(i), Feb. 23, 2012; see Jorge Contesse, Contestation and
Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at
123, 125 (discussing debates as to the proper scope of ECtHR authority); Roberto Gargarella, La
democracia frente a los crímenes masivos: una reflexión a la luz del caso Gelman, 2 REV.
LATINOAMERICANA DE DER. INT’L 1, 8–10, May 29, 2015.
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unanimously espouse a presumption of authority at more local levels, but they
differ on important details. This article considers how subsidiarity may be
brought to bear on the challenges the ECtHR and the IACtHR face. The article
focuses on two politically salient, normative questions. First, should states—
even well-functioning democracies—subject themselves to ICs with the
authority to interpret and adjudicate alleged violations of relevant human-rights
treaties? Second, is it is consistent with their mission of protecting human rights
3
that ICs grant the states some discretion, that is, a “margin of appreciation,” or
does such discretion nullify the human-rights protection the ICs were
established to provide?
This article suggests that states have subsidiarity-based rationales for
binding themselves to ICs and that the ICs should grant states a conditional
margin of appreciation with respect to certain human rights. A historical and
empirical backdrop explains how these ICs can protect human rights while
being duly deferential to state sovereignty, even for states with minimal
democratic credentials. Subsidiarity considerations identify the authority a
human-rights court or treaty body should enjoy as well as limits it should face.
In particular, subsidiarity arguments help delineate the margin of appreciation
that the ECtHR grants states in determining whether certain human-rights
violations have occurred.
The discussion of these ICs lends support to several of the assumptions
4
concerning subsidiarity outlined in this issue’s introduction. Part II provides an
overview of some of the discussions concerning the concept of subsidiarity. Part
III lays out some explanatory subsidiarity arguments—reasons why states have
agreed to self-binding by human-rights ICs—and discusses why these arguments
have become more contested. Part IV presents some relevant features of the
ECtHR and its history, including its margin-of-appreciation doctrine, and part
V explains how the ECtHR addresses the dilemma of protecting democratic
sovereignty while protecting human rights by considering when and why
democratic decisions merit deference. Part VI concludes, discussing some of the
implications for how subsidiarity arguments apply to human rights and
considering in more detail the six conjectures from this issue’s introduction.
II
SUBSIDIARITY
Principles of subsidiarity, theorems in normative political theory, urge a
rebuttable presumption for the local. Local authorities should enjoy as much
authority as possible, so long as it is consistent with achieving the particular,

3. Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of
Human Rights, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 240 (1996) [hereinafter Brems, The Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine].
4. See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1.
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5

normatively permitted or required objectives of the relevant IC. The burden of
argument, due to this presumption for the local, thus rests with proponents of
centralized authority. Beyond these broad statements, different conceptions of
subsidiarity vary drastically in how they formulate this presumption. Generally,
central bodies must offer comparable effectiveness or efficiency when they
exercise authority over the constituent bodies, but conceptions diverge as to
who decides on the objectives; whether central authority is required; and, if
such authority is required, what kind. Consider, for instance, the scope of issues
of concern: the relations between the head of family and the individual
members, the powers of the central unit in relation to federation members, or
the power of an international human-rights court over the states that have
submitted to the court’s governing human-rights treaty. The normative
conception of subsidiarity used here is person centered rather than state
centered. Authority should be placed with states or international bodies only
insofar as such centralization better promotes and protects the interests of
6
individual persons rather than states. Thus, constraints imposed by humanrights ICs on state sovereignty are justified only insofar as they promote and
7
protect individuals’ interests better than would a state system without ICs.
A separate yet related role of subsidiarity is as an explanatory hypothesis to
explain why certain actors subject themselves to international bodies.
Empirically, it is usually only when actors are convinced that their interests are
served by placing some authority with a regional or international body that
8
delegate authority to it. Thus, explanatory subsidiarity, which views states and
the interests of their governments as the fundamental explanatory units within a
soft rationalist framework, accounts for several features of international law—
9
not only in the area of human rights, but also arguably more generally. These
features include a prevalent understanding of the centrality of state consent in
10
creating such legal obligations —the requirement that national remedies must
11
be exhausted before turning to international courts and treaty bodies —and the
12
often-weak treaty sanctions.
5. Andreas Føllesdal, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 191 (1998).
6. Andreas Føllesdal, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International
Law, 2 GLOBAL CONST. 37, 61−62 (2013).
7. See id.
8. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS 12−13 (2009).
9. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40 (2003); Føllesdal, supra note 6, at 61.
10. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003); Luigi Crema,
Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s), 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 681, 699 (2010);
Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15
EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 912 (2004); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review
Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1023,
1025 (2012).
11. Cf. Contesse, supra note 2, at 129–30, 133 (discussing general requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies before bringing case to international system).
12. See Carozza, supra note 9, at 62–63 (discussing lack of definitive international interpreters or
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Another expression of explanatory subsidiarity may be the ECtHR practice
of granting states a margin of appreciation when assessing whether they are in
compliance with their obligations. But this gives rise to two central questions:
First, is this court-established doctrine consistent with the states’ transfer of
authority to the ECtHR? And, second, if not, is it nonetheless justifiable as a
way for the court to defer to democratic rule?
This article addresses explanatory subsidiarity mainly from a normative
perspective, recognizing that states may have an interest both in maintaining a
broad scope of autonomy and in restraining the power of the ECtHR and the
IACtHR. The practice of granting states a margin of appreciation may be
justified by normative subsidiarity arguments ultimately based on protecting
and promoting individuals’ interests. This argument first requires considering
the rationale for why states should submit to human-rights ICs, if at all, and
then calls for exploring the reasons why these courts should grant states some
such margin of discretion.
III
WHY STATES BIND THEMSELVES TO HUMAN-RIGHTS ICS AND WHY THESE
RATIONALES BECOME LESS SALIENT
The normative issues concerning international human-rights review and the
margin of appreciation may best be approached by considering why states
subject themselves to regional human-rights conventions and their treaty
bodies, such as the ECtHR and the IACtHR, and why states have recently
become more critical to such subjection.
States have established many treaties with ICs to help alleviate collective13
action problems among and within states. For example, ICs promote trade
14
within the European Union (EU) or the World Trade Organization. An
independent and impartial authoritative body can help resolve prisoners’
dilemmas and free-rider fears between states in the commercial context by
monitoring compliance, reviewing domestic legislation and administrative
decisions, and interpreting and adjudicating agreements that mutually bind the
15
disputing states. Thus, states agree to be bound by ICs to ensure that other
states do likewise and to secure otherwise unattainable mutually beneficial
results.
However, human-rights ICs do not fit this model. Rather, the ECtHR and
the IACtHR adjudicate disputes between individuals and their own states
enforcers of international rights); Føllesdal, supra note 6, at 56.
13. Laurence R. Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained
Independence, in CONFERENCES ON NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 253, 260 (Mohr Siebeck ed., 2006).
14. Giandomenico Majone, State, Market and Regulatory Competition in the European Union:
Lessons for the Integrating World Economy, in CENTRALIZATION OR FRAGMENTATION?: EUROPE
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF DEEPENING, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRACY 94, 120−21 (Andrew
Moravcsik ed., 1998).
15. Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation,
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2008, at 49.
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regarding whether the states have complied with relevant conventions, and
review the compatibility between conventions and national laws and practices.
These ICs do not address collective-action problems among states. Instead,
states submit to these courts in order to enhance their own credibility as humanrights–committed legal and political orders. Thus regional human-rights courts
help the states bind themselves, rather than other private or public actors.
When a state constrains its sovereignty in this way, it is “both a self-binding precommitment on the part of the legislature, and an other-binding choice made to
bind future legislative actors and units within the political system to the
16
constitutional bargain.”
A state may want to use an IC to provide such assurance to many relevant
public audiences. First, a state may bind itself to an IC to enhance trust in its
domestic population that the particular government is committed to human
rights and that future generations of its government will remain committed. A
second important audience is comprised of opposing political parties that might
otherwise pursue human-rights–violating platforms. Indeed, several states
originally wanted to give the ECtHR more significant powers than those with
which it was originally equipped precisely for that reason: to “lock in” human
17
rights as a constraint on future governments. Furthermore, a state may ratify
18
human-rights conventions to gain “legitimacy in the eyes of other states.” The
fear of illegitimacy may be especially acute when almost all other states have
19
signed a convention, resulting in a stigma attaching to nonsignatory states. In
the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, reputational concerns
were supplemented with material benefits because the ECtHR gradually
20
became a gatekeeper to the Council of Europe. In order to provide such an
assurance of liberalized democracy, the IC must be sufficiently independent of
21
the states it reviews. In particular, the states should not be the final interpreter
of a convention, or the attempt to provide assurance to other audiences will fail.
If a state no longer needs an IC to maintain credibility with the various
audiences, the state will naturally seek to limit the relevant court’s ability to
constrain state sovereignty. For example, in the Americas in the 1990s the
political opposition shifted from an authoritarian regime-in-waiting, to other
22
parties equally committed to human rights. Thus, the governments committed
16. Id.
17. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 220 (2000).
18. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1384 (2005).
19. See SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing the “social and political pressures of remaining
aloof from a multilateral agreement to which most of [a state’s] peers have already committed”).
20. Alter, supra note 15, at 66.
21. See Helfer, supra note 13, at 257 (“[I]ndependent tribunals provide a mechanism to enhance
the credibility of the otherwise less than fully credible promises that governments make to one
another.”).
22. See Contesse, supra note 2, at 130 (explaining the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy).
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to democratic rule no longer needed the IACtHR as a last resort to remedy
future massive human-rights violations.
These historical changes help explain the surge in criticism of both the
IACtHR and the ECtHR. Critics assert that these ICs intervene too forcefully
23
into issues that should not be subject to international judicial review. Instead,
critics argue that the respective courts should grant the states a broader margin
of appreciation.
For example, scholars have noted two historical changes in the violations
24
brought to the ECtHR. The Court was originally established as
an “early warning system” to prevent states from lapsing into totalitarianism. It set out
the fundamental rights and freedoms that states should secure to everyone in their
jurisdiction, and provided a judicial enforcement system—the European Court of
Human Rights—by which states which violated human rights could be called to
25
account.

As the states developed into strong, generally well-functioning democracies,
though, the ECtHR’s role changed to helping correct their minor flaws as
regards human-rights violations. With the crop of new states that joined the
Council of Europe, the Court was required to refocus its efforts to “consolidate
26
democracy and the rule of law in new and relatively fragile democracies.”
Once the new member states joined the EU, some joined the ranks of critics,
complaining about the sovereignty constraints imposed by the ECtHR as
27
politicized attacks.
These changes help explain growing number of calls to reduce the
competences of the human-rights ICs in both jurisdictions. Critics have argued,
for example, that the IACtHR should be more deferential to decisions
28
emerging from high-quality democratic processes and should defer to the
29
states’ interpretations or applications of the Convention, in effect granting
states a margin of appreciation in such cases.
Similarly, in preparation for a 2012 Council of Europe meeting, the United
Kingdom proposed that the ECtHR should grant states a broad margin of
appreciation and that the Court should no longer have the ultimate authority to
30
interpret the ECHR. Rather, the United Kingdom urged that the Court should

23. See generally Roberto Gargarella, In Search of Democratic Justice: What Courts Should Not
Do: Argentina, 1983–2002, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 181 (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin Skaar
eds., 2004).
24. See generally LORD WOOLF, REVIEW OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Julia Lapitskaya, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two Is Not Company and Three Is Definitely
a Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 479, 499 (2011).
28. Gargarella, supra note 2, at 9–11.
29. Contesse, supra note 2, at 133 (indicating that the Inter-American Court has asserted its own
authority as the final interpreter of the American Convention).
30. Council of Europe, Draft Brighton Declaration, supra note 2.
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override a state’s interpretation only if the “national court clearly erred in its
31
interpretation or application of the Convention rights.”
The United Kingdom’s suggestions have received mixed responses. Former
President of the IACtHR and current International Court of Justice judge
Cançado Trindade has objected to the IACtHR’s use of the margin-of32
appreciation doctrine. Likewise, several authors regard this doctrine as an
abdication by the ECtHR. They argue,
[W]here national procedures are notoriously prone to failure, most evident when
minority rights and interests are involved, no margin and no consensus should be
tolerated. Anything less than the assumption of full responsibility
would amount to a
33
breach of duty by the international human rights organs.

The United Kingdom’s initiative did not constrain the ECtHR as much as
the draft recommended: The states agreed to Protocol No. 15, not yet in force,
which refers to an ECtHR-established margin-of-appreciation doctrine and to
34
subsidiarity in the Preamble of the Convention. But no changes were made
concerning the ultimate authority on interpreting the ECHR—that remains the
35
ECtHR—contrary to the United Kingdom’s proposal.
How can a normative principle of subsidiarity help assess these proposals?
The answer requires more relevant details about the ECtHR and the margin-ofappreciation doctrine.
IV
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENCE
YET MORE DEFERENCE TO STATES VIA THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
The ECtHR is the most powerful of the human-rights ICs because it issues
legally binding judgments. The express role of the Court is subsidiary vis-à-vis
the states. The Court shall “ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the
36
Protocols.” This complex role has required a combination of independence
37
from and subservience to the states.
The ECtHR has gradually increased its autonomy, which no doubt has
31. Id.
32. ANTONIO A. CANCADO TRINDADE, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS EN EL SIGLO XXI 390 (2009).
33. Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 843, 853–54 (1998–99).
34. Council of Europe, Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., June 24, 2013.
35. Council of Europe, Draft Brighton Declaration, supra note 2; cf. European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 19.
36. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1.
37. Id. art. 21, ¶¶ 2–3; Helfer, supra note 13 at 263; Erik Voeten, International Judicial
Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 421, 438 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark Pollack
eds., 2013).
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fuelled the protests from some states. Originally, individuals could make
complaints to the European Commission on Human Rights, which would
38
forward to the ECtHR those complaints it found admissible. In 1990, Protocol
39
No. 9 allowed individuals to bring cases directly, and in 1998, Protocol No. 11
both rendered the Court a full-time institution to allow it to handle more cases
40
and abolished the Commission.
The Court has also engaged in dynamic interpretation of the ECHR,
reading far more rights into it than the states would have envisioned in the
41
1950s. The ECtHR has held, for example, that the Convention prohibits
42
43
corporal punishment, human trafficking, and certain forms of religious
44
teaching in public schools, and that it protects the right not to join a trade
45
union.
Notwithstanding trends of increasing independence from states, the ECtHR
has not always sought to maximize its autonomy and powers of judicial humanrights review. In particular, the Court has developed the margin-of-appreciation
doctrine, which urges the Court to defer to the domestic judiciary’s assessment
46
of whether there is a breach of the Convention.
47
Many trace the doctrine back to the 1958 Cyprus case, in which the
Commission asserted that under the derogation clause in Article 15, U.K.

38. ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69 n.109 (2010).
39. Id. at 167.
40. Id. at 460–62.
41. See Janneke Gerards, Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF HIGHEST COURTS’ RULINGS: JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND BEYOND 407, 429
(Nick Huls, Maurice Adams & Jaco Bomhoff eds., 2009) (“the Convention is a living instrument which
. . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” (quoting Tyrer vs. United Kingdom,
App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A/26) 1, 12 (1978))).
42. Tyrer, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 31.
43. Rantsev v. Cyprus & Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 124.
44. Folgero v. Norway, App. 2007-IIIEur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 94.
45. Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7601/76; 7806/77, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38,
55 (1981).
46. For more in-depth accounts and criticisms, see YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE ECHR (2001); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2006); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF
INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2007); Yutaka AraiTakahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Theoretical Analysis of Strasbourg’s Variable
Geometry, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 62 (Andreas Føllesdal et al. eds., 2013); Brems, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine, supra note 3, at 240; Eva Brems, Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 5 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 282 (2011); Eva Brems & Laurens
Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human Rights, 35
HUM. RTS. Q. 176 (2013); George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and
Legitimacy, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 106 (Andreas Føllesdal et al. eds., 2013).
47. Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 326 (1958), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00173858.

7-FOLLESDAL INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2016]

6/13/2016 3:14 PM

SUBSIDIARITY AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-RIGHTS COURTS

155

authorities enjoyed a certain measure of discretion to assess the extent of rights
violations justified by the public-emergency situation. The Court developed the
48
doctrine and its rationale more fully in cases heard in the 1960s.
The ECtHR reviews whether state legislation or policy that appears to
violate the Convention has acceptable objectives and whether the legislation is
49
proportionate to the objectives pursued. Generally, only when the Court is
convinced that the state has performed a satisfactory proportionality test, will
50
the ECtHR defer to the domestic judiciary’s decision.
Several central aspects of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine are important
in assessing it. The ECtHR rarely offers a margin of appreciation for violations
of the nonderogable rights to life or the rights against torture, slavery, or forced
51
labor. The ECtHR is also very restrictive in granting a margin of appreciation
for rights concerning political participation, freedom of expression, and other
52
rights required for well-functioning democratic decisionmaking.
53
Several ECHR rights explicitly provide for exceptions. More specifically,
the ECtHR claims that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine is particularly
appropriate in three main scenarios in which domestic authorities are better
54
suited to judge given that they have conducted a proportionality assessment:
1. When ‘balancing’ against other urgent issues such as emergencies, public
safety, the economic well-being of the country, as permitted by Articles
8, 9, and 10;
55
2. When balancing different rights against each other;
3. When applying the human-rights norms to specific circumstances of a
state.
48. See generally Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-57506; Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737
(1979–80); see also Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 15, 58 (1979–80)
(examining contours of discretion under derogation clause).
49. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 46, at 200; see ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 142
(2012).
50. See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 130 (holding that where Parliament
had not made a proportionality assessment, “[the policy was] seen as falling outside any acceptable
margin of appreciation”).
51. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 2–4.
52. Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13585/88, 53 (1991) (Pekkanen, J., partly
dissenting), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705 (“[T]aking into account the vital importance in a
democratic society of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, the State’s margin of
appreciation in these cases is very narrow indeed.”); see also Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at
754–55 (“The Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles
characterizing a ‘democratic society.’”).
53. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 8–10.
54. For thorough and systematic overviews, see Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine,
supra note 3 and Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights
and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, 14
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 381 (2011–12).
55. Lillo-Stenberg & Saether v. Norway, App. No. 13258/09, 88 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-140015.
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States may be justified in violating some individuals’ rights but only if the
restrictions on rights are proportionate to certain acceptable social objectives or
56
other rights. When the ECtHR seeks to decide this, it must determine whether
the state’s policy minimizes the violation of rights required to achieve the
57
objectives.
The ECtHR has specified an additional important requirement for granting
states a margin of appreciation: that the state must give evidence of this
58
proportionality test. The state must have assessed whether there is
59
proportionality or a “fair balance” between the means and the end sought.
Case law has developed five elements of this proportionality test:
1. The legitimacy of the social objective pursued;
2. How important the restricted or derogated right is, for example, as a
foundation of a democratic society;
3. How invasive the proposed interference will be;
4. Whether the restriction of the right is necessary;
5. Whether the reasons offered by the national authorities are relevant and
60
sufficient.
The ECtHR also assesses whether the state has carried out these steps in a
61
substantively satisfactory way. Indeed, the Court sometimes holds that a state’s
62
test is unacceptable.
But the Court may decide against granting a margin of appreciation if the
legislation or policy at hand runs counter to an observed emerging consensus in
Europe, sometimes expressed as “the existence or non-existence of common
63
ground between the laws of the Contracting States.” When it perceives such a
consensus, the Court may require the accused state to provide an even more
64
convincing argument for its policies, but the Court has also ruled against
65
accused states on this ground. The Court’s attention to emerging consensus
56. See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 122 (explaining that some public
legitimate aims “necessarily involve[] some limitation on an individual’s rights”).
57. Animal Defs. Int’l v. United Kingdom, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, 227–28.
58. Lindheim & Others v. Norway, App. No. 13221/08; 2139/10, 61 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 37 (2015).
59. Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 228.
60. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737, 755
(1979–80) (explaining that intrusions in certain spheres must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued”).
61. Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R.. at 227–28.
62. A v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, 74 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92137.
63. Rasmussen v. Denmark, App. No. 8777/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 371, 380 (1985); Brems, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, supra note 3, at 263; see also X,Y & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No.
21830/93 (1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58032 (granting wide margin of appreciation to
contracting states with differing laws).
64. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 317 (1997–98).
65. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A/26) 1, 31 (1978).
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may be a good way to check its dynamic interpretation of the ECHR. However,
the Court does not appear to have an established procedure to ascertain the
requisite consensus. And critics claim that the weight of the consensus factor is
66
indeterminate.
Before moving to a normative assessment of the margin-of-appreciation
doctrine as part of the ECtHR’s practice, consider what may have motivated
the Court to develop such a complex procedure. The judges may have had at
least two, possibly compatible, objectives. First, the Court may have developed
this doctrine to build its legitimacy by avoiding controversial decisions against
powerful actors. However, this alone cannot explain the limits of the doctrine
and its complex features and conditions. The Court’s margin-of-appreciation
doctrine goes beyond what a simple avoidance strategy would predict because
these aspects are justified as elements of the subsidiary role of the ECtHR vis-àvis the member states. These features can thus be better explained by the
judges’ attempts to pursue the Court’s objectives as defined in the ECHR: to
bolster the domestic authorities’ respect for human rights and to help protect
individuals against human-rights violations. Note that this role of the ECtHR as
a mechanism for states to bind themselves to certain standards does not
incentivize the Court to impose ever-stricter requirements on the states. To the
contrary, the margin-of-appreciation doctrine expresses a principle of
subsidiarity regarding the Court’s respect for democratic decisionmaking.
V
DUE RESPECT FOR DEMOCRACY: THE CONDITIONAL CASE FOR
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL RIGHTS REVIEW
67

Several Council of Europe states rate poorly on “democratic quality.” The
case for a review body such as the ECtHR to protect citizens’ human rights
seems more plausible for these states. But for well-functioning democracies, the
ECtHR’s practices, including the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, appear odd:
objectionably antidemocratic and not sufficiently protective of human rights.
To justify the ECtHR’s role and authority, one must first recall the reasons
to value democratic rule and the conditions under which these arguments apply.
It will then become clear that, in light of the reasons for valuing democracy, the
criticism that the Court is antidemocratic does not hold up.
Assume that democracy is a set of institutionally established procedures that
regulate competition for control over political authority on the basis of
deliberation where almost all adult citizens may participate as equals in an

66. Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence, and the European Convention on Human Rights,
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 139 (1993); see also Benvenisti, supra note 33, at 852 (“The consensus
rationale . . . is but a convenient subterfuge.”).
67. DEMOCRACY WATCH, www.democracywatch.ca (last visited Feb. 10, 2016); CENTER FOR
SYSTEMIC PEACE, Polity IV Project, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2016).
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68

electoral mechanism. At least two reasons to respect such democratic selfgovernance should give pause to international judicial review as done by the
ECtHR. Indeed, the Court itself mentions several of them. The best
instrumental argument for such democratic decisionmaking seems to be
comparative. Democratic rule is, over time, more responsive to the best
interests of all members of the political order than nondemocratic procedures.
Such interests include self-determination and nondomination, as well as the
security of basic needs and fairly shared benefits of social cooperation among
69
inhabitants. Thus, respect for individuals’ interest in self-determination and
70
nondomination is a concern the Court often acknowledges. A second
argument in favor of local democratic decisionmaking is epistemic: those closer
to real-world circumstances are better equipped to determine the policy choices
71
that promote and protect the interests of those affected by those choices.
These arguments for democratic rule hold under only certain conditions.
There are at least three reasons to be wary of unlimited majoritarian democratic
rule, and in each case, an IC may help reduce the concern. First, the benefits of
72
majority rule reliably accrue only from well-functioning democracies. An IC
may be particularly important when such democratic institutions are not in
place. Second, well-functioning majoritarian democratic procedures can
deteriorate. An IC that monitors and safeguards the democratic process is thus
73
consistent with valuing democracy. Third, even well-functioning democracies
sometimes render flawed decisions, due to insufficient information in a
particular case, ignorance, or even ill will. A body that seeks to prevent
miscarriages of democratic deliberation and abuse of majority voting may thus
provide important services. Majoritarian rule should especially be reviewed to
ensure that the interests of minorities are sufficiently secured and promoted
given the high probability that democratic decisions could be to their detriment,
74
with minority interests and basic rights on the chopping block.
Respect for majoritarian democracy is compatible with review of decisions
that violate the rights of minorities or the individual rights necessary for a well68. Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37 (1998); Andreas Føllesdal & Simon Hix, Why
There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 533, 547–49 (2006).
69. Cf. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 113
(1989); Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE, 77, 94–96 (Margaret Levi &
Valerie Braithwaite eds., 1998).
70. See Hatton v. United Kingdom, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 189, 216 (explaining that
democratic national authorities, rather than international courts, are better equipped to evaluate local
needs).
71. Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 30–31 (1997);
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 737, 755 (1979–80).
72. Characteristics of well-functioning democracies include, for example, the freedom of
expression and a broadly dispersed right to vote.
73. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 43
(1980) (describing courts as “institution[s] charged with the evolution and application of society’s
fundamental principles”).
74. BRIAN BARRY, DEMOCRACY AND POWER: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 339 (1989).
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functioning democracy. And the ECtHR provides precisely that. The Court’s
review enables states to better respect individuals’ human rights and other
75
interests.
Judicial review by an IC like the ECtHR contributes to domestic human76
rights review in at least three ways. First, an IC is even more independent from
the domestic government than the domestic judiciary and can provide citizens
more trustworthy assurance of their government’s human-rights compliance.
Second, the ECtHR can also enhance the independence and quality of the
domestic judiciary with respect to human-rights protection by supporting its
human-rights judgments against the state. Third, a state that subjects itself to
the ECtHR thereby helps protect and promote the human rights of citizens in
other European states by pressuring less democratic states to also consent to
77
the Court’s authority. These three arguments apply a person-centered
conception of subsidiarity; they support granting a body above the state certain
authority in order to benefit the interests of individuals.
Regarding the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, if international judicial
review is so valuable, why limit it by granting states a margin of appreciation?
Subsidiarity arguments help clarify this issue. Recall from part IV several
relevant aspects. First the limited scope of application of the doctrine: some
nonderogable rights are excluded. Violations of nonderogable rights arguably
do not merit deference, and the ECtHR should instead protect these individual
rights with full force. The margin of appreciation is likewise not granted for
rights central to the functioning of democratic mechanisms. The ECtHR, then,
only grants a margin when the state’s decisions reflect democratic deliberation.
On the other hand, subsidiarity considerations suggest that states should
remain the final arbiter of human-rights violations when the ECtHR cannot or
is unlikely to provide better protection of human rights, because then the
objectives are not better achieved by allocating that authority above the state.
A state should enjoy a margin of appreciation for those circumstances in which
domestic courts and other authorities are expected to be at least as well
equipped and willing as the ECtHR to determine whether there is a violation of
human rights. These circumstances match several features of the margin-ofappreciation doctrine. The ECtHR claims that a margin of appreciation is
particularly appropriate in those issue areas where domestic authorities are
better suited to judge given that they have conducted a proportionality
78
assessment. There is no general reason to suspect that a well-functioning
democratic majoritarian system with an independent, competent judiciary will

75. Helfer, supra note 13, at 262.
76. Id.
77. SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 58.
78. Recall that a proportionality assessment involves balancing rights against urgent issues such as
emergencies, public safety, and the economic well-being of the country; balancing different rights
against each other; and applying the human-rights norms to specific circumstances within a state. See
notes 54–57.

7-FOLLESDAL INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

160

6/13/2016 3:14 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:147

make rights-infringing decisions in these cases. An IC is not clearly more likely
than domestic courts to properly apply the ECHR to such disputes.
However, these instrumental and comparative arguments for respecting
democratic decisions and domestic judicial review hold only when the
appropriate deliberation and assessments have actually been carried out and
when the legislature has explored alternative policies and their implications for
human rights. Thus, there are good reasons for the ECtHR to grant a margin of
appreciation only when it is convinced that domestic authorities have actually
carried out a proper proportionality test. Indeed, this proportionality-test
requirement may help nudge states into more careful public deliberation of the
kind that gives citizens reason to value democratic decisions. If the legislature
performs such a test, it is more likely to be granted a margin of appreciation and
to avoid the embarrassment of being found in violation of the ECHR. The
Court’s proportionality-test requirement may thus promote better democratic
deliberation and bolster the effectiveness of domestic judicial scrutiny.
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine may also weaken, but not refute, an
argument against judicial review. The doctrine, at least when carefully specified
and consistently applied, reduces the risk of states being subject to the arbitrary
discretion of the judges of the ECtHR. The proportionality requirement also
guides judges’ discretion and thus reduces the possibility of arbitrariness.
The ECtHR also faces general challenges concerning how subsidiarity
should be applied when states have drastically different democratic credentials.
Other human-rights ICs such as the IACtHR have long been faced with these
79
challenges. In these circumstances, subsidiarity arguments may counsel more
intervention and assistance to national authorities by the IC even though the IC
may face more criticism from states and challenges to its authority.
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine lets the ECtHR avoid some such
controversial assessments. The doctrine focuses exclusively on the
proportionality test performed by domestic authorities in the particular case
being considered, disregarding whether the test is the normal mode of
decisionmaking in that state. Arguments based on subsidiarity may conclude
that such nudging may be more appropriate than more contentious assertions
by the Court about the democratic quality of the state insofar as the Court’s
role is to bolster domestic human-rights mechanisms and protect against
human-rights violations among states that are generally committed to these
values. Therefore, person-centered subsidiarity arguments support the limits to
international review imposed by the ECtHR’s margin-of-appreciation doctrine.
VI
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the role of subsidiarity in international humanrights courts, particularly the ECtHR, but also the IACtHR. Many ICs, for
79. See generally Contesse, supra note 2.
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example those pertaining to trade, resolve various collective-action problems by
ensuring that each state complies with agreed-upon standards. Human-rights
ICs have a different main function when utilized by states. A state—even one
with a well-functioning democracy—agrees to the authority of human-rights ICs
largely to assure various audiences of their commitment to human rights. In
examining how normative arguments for subsidiarity apply to human-rights ICs,
this article explored how a person-centered conception of subsidiarity supports
the ECtHR’s margin-of-appreciation doctrine. This doctrine limits the scope of
the ECtHR’s human-rights review to issue areas where its review can better
advance states’ protection and promotion of their citizens’ human rights than
states’ domestic judicial review. The discussion about the ECtHR and its
margin-of-appreciation doctrine thus illustrates how subsidiarity may support
either centralization or decentralization, depending on whether the state has
conducted a proportionality test. Without such a test, the presumption in favor
of the local authority disappears, and the ECtHR neither will nor should grant a
margin of appreciation.
One upshot of these arguments is that a margin of appreciation may not be
appropriate for international courts generally, notwithstanding other scholars’
80
arguments to the contrary. A convergence toward a margin-of-appreciation
doctrine across ICs cannot be detected. Furthermore, the considerations in
favor of a margin-of-appreciation doctrine do not obviously hold for ICs other
than the ECtHR, as the ECtHR is significantly different from ICs established to
address collective-action problems such as reducing barriers to international
trade. States have good reason to be skeptical of granting each other discretion
to determine their own compliance with such treaties where there are strong
temptations for each state to free ride on the compliance of others.
The discussion also sheds light on the conjectures made in this issue’s
introduction. The ECtHR’s increased independence and the backlash in the
form of the U.K.-led agreement on Protocol No. 15, which seeks to constrain
the Court, lends credence to several, but not all, of the conjectures.
Conjecture 1 holds that a vertical multilevel system with more significant
authority at the global level will engender calls for subsidiarity to limit further
expansion of IC authority. The concerns expressed by the United Kingdom and
others leading to Protocol No. 15 exemplify conjecture one. As a multilevel
system, the European human-rights regime has developed significant authority.
At the same time, several states have less need for the credibility gained from
self-binding arrangements. This has fueled an express demand for more
decentralizing subsidiarity, with states therefore agreeing that the ECtHR
81
should grant states a margin of appreciation in the Preamble of the ECHR.
The support for this change also exemplifies conjectures two and three.
Conjecture 2 calls for subsidiarity to increase as state consent recedes—a mode
80. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16
EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909 (2005).
81. Council of Europe, Protocol No. 15, supra note 34, pmbl.
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of legitimation, more so for delegated pooled authority. And conjecture 3
suggests that demand for subsidiarity also increases when global institutions
intervene deeper into specific local affairs. The human-rights ICs do indeed
review a wide range of domestic legislation and policies, even more so as a
result of dynamic interpretation. Thus, the ECtHR influences issues often
regarded as core to state sovereignty, such as determining who should have the
right to vote and prohibiting expulsion of suspected threats to national
82
security.
Conjecture 4 holds that subsidiarity arguments in favor of leaving issues to
local authorities are accepted to a greater degree when few negative
externalities are present. This article suggests that Conjecture 4 applies to
human-rights ICs due to their main role as a self-binding mechanism rather
than as a response to a collective-action problem among states. The main topic
of concern to the ECtHR is how states treat their own citizens, with few
implications that impinge on other states. Thus, few states, if any, have
registered strong objections to granting a margin of appreciation.
Conjecture 5 asserts that powerful actors with strong interests in imposing
uniform interpretation of regime rules upon other countries will protest
subsidiarity, with less resistance by such actors indifferent to such uniformity.
This is also consistent with the human-rights ICs, given their role as selfcommitment devices. No strong actors object to the margin-of-appreciation
doctrine, partly because it does not lend itself to free riding among states. Only
seldom would a state have a major interest in restricting other states’ humanrights practices. This is one of the differences between the collective-actionproblem-solving ICs and the human-rights ICs. The main objective of the
ECtHR is not to promote uniformity among states but, rather, to ensure
human-rights standards in each state. Other states have little to lose by allowing
variations as to how the standards are met, partly because there is no free-rider
problem at stake among them.
Conjecture 6 holds that central-level institutions that enjoy significant and
stable institutional and political autonomy are unlikely to support subsidiarity
arguments in favor of more local authority. Regional human-rights courts such
as the ECtHR seem to contradict this intuitively plausible conjecture. It was the
ECtHR itself that initiated the margin-of-appreciation doctrine, which
expresses such subsidiarity in favor of local autonomy. The Court has
developed the doctrine since 1958—during periods when the Court has been
autonomous and enjoyed broad support. Thus, the doctrine does not seem to be
motivated only by a concern to avoid confrontations with powerful states. The
complex scope and requirements of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine would
not be expected if the Court introduced the doctrine only to maintain states’
support. However, these complexities are plausible—and defensible—in light of
the subsidiary role of the ECtHR vis-à-vis states. The ECtHR helps states
82. Aswat v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12, 58 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 11 (2014); Hirst v. United
Kingdom (II), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 198.
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enhance their long-term credibility with various stakeholders, including
domestic populations and other states. This has left the ECtHR with few
institutional incentives to empower itself at the cost of state sovereignty.
This article argued that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine with a
proportionality test may provide a helpful, practical resolution of the dilemma
the ECtHR faces of choosing between respecting democratic state sovereignty
and promoting human rights. Considerations of subsidiarity help indicate how
the margin-of-appreciation doctrine and the proportionality test may be
defended in principle. Importantly, subsidiarity may also shed light on how
international human-rights courts generally, and the ECtHR in particular, may
be improved in practice. At the same time, this discussion has illustrated that
appeals to a principle of subsidiarity do not settle the issue at hand or end the
discussion. To the contrary, appeals to subsidiarity, at best, may help structure
important debates about how to allocate and use authority in multilevel systems
of global and regional governance.

